Here’s why killing the head of Islamic State wouldn’t yield results

PHOTO: An aerial view shows the compound that Osama bin Laden was killed in, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. /Department of Defense

Many believe that killing the leaders of terrorist organizations like Islamic State could change the course of events in Iraq and Syria. Like the cutting off of a snake’s head, eliminating the chief of a terrorist organization is assumed to deal it a fatal or near fatal blow. The U.S. government, for instance, has often boasted about eliminating major al Qaeda leaders, and viewed such assassinations as a clear mark of progress in the ‘global war on terror.’
Yet there are reasons to question the premise that killing terrorist leaders is tantamount to progress. Indeed, rather than cutting off the head of a snake, killing off terrorist leaders resembles the decapitating a hydra, the mythological monster reputed to replace severed heads with multiple new ones.
Admittedly, in some cases assassinating or arresting a major terrorist leader may paralyze the organization for years to come. Such was the case with Abimail Guzman, the philosopher-leader of the Peruvian Shining Path organization, and with Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party, both of whom have been imprisoned for years. Fathi Shaqaqi, the founding chief of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was assassinated by Israeli security forces in 1995, which disrupted the organization for a number of years.
In all these cases, however, the disruption was temporary and sooner or later the groups in question recovered their resolve and resumed the fight.
Moreover, major terrorist organizations have cleverly adapted to the loss of their chief honchos. Eliminated leaders are typically replaced by others waiting in the wings. In addition to this, some organizations respond to assassinations by loosening their hierarchical structure and allowing local leaders greater freedom. This reduces their dependence on select few figures at the top and spreads their risk.
Palestinian organizations adopted this tactic in response to targeted killings of their leaders by the Israelis. So did al Qaeda, which dispersed power that was highly concentrated in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region to a world-wide network of affiliates carrying the al Qaeda banner.
In defense of this Western strategy, some would respond by saying that terrorist leaders are in short supply. They posit that sooner or later their numbers will be exhausted, thus causing severe degradation of the organizations’ fighting capacity.
Available evidence does not unequivocally support this claim. If the group boasts a wide appeal, its supply pool of leadership talent may be large and able to replenish itself.
It is important to remember that the killing of Osama bin Laden, though of symbolic importance, didn’t seem to offer the U.S. an appreciable strategic advantage in the fight against al Qaeda, nor did it appreciably alter the status of war against jihadist terrorism.
Occasionally, the ‘replacement’ leader might actually be more adept and dangerous than the chief whom he came to replace, so one needs to be careful what one wishes for.
Abu Musab al Zarqawi, founder of al Qaeda in Iraq was a formidable enemy, but not as formidable as his replacement, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. Baghdadi is the current leader of Islamic State and is widely proclaimed to be one of the biggest threats to world security.
Similarly, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the current leader of the Hezbollah is considerably more dangerous to Israel than Abbas al-Musawi, the former head of the group who was assassinated in 1992.
That said, there is no question that the pressure of killing campaigns significantly degrades the organizations’ operational capability. Targeted leaders are forced to spend significant portions of their time looking over their shoulder and protecting themselves.
Their ability to communicate with subordinates is hampered, they are compelled to frequently change locations, and are often forced to remain invisible for long stretches of time. Not to be underestimated either is the psychological toll on leaders who are constantly on the run.
The Palestinian leaders’ reactions to targeted killings attest to the campaign’s impact. Time and time again, they have demanded that Israel end the policy. Abdel Aziz al- Rantisi, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin’s successor as head of Hamas, conceded that the killing campaign posed significant hardships for his organization.
All told then, targeted killings have their place and remain a useful tactical tool in the kit of counterterrorism strategists, if only for the constant pressure they bring to bear on terrorist organizations.
However useful they are in the short run, however, they are unlikely to bring an end to terrorism. They are a vehicle, not a panacea, and the billions of dollars spent on their implementation might not be worth it after all.